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Responsibility and the Modern Corporation
Jeroen Veldman
1 Introduction
Corporate governance crises as well as human rights issues in global value chains
have pushed notions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Citizen-
ship (CC), Triple P (People, Planet, Profit) and sustainable development onto the
agenda of corporations and into the discussion of corporate governance.1 However,
it has been argued that the CSR debate tends to rest on rather underspecified
conceptions of the public corporation and corporate governance.2
CSR has been expanded upon by a discussion of political CSR (PCSR), in which
a generally positive assessment of the capacity and willingness of corporations and
corporate groups to be effective as agents who can provide ‘innovative solutions
and approaches to some of the most pressing issues on today’s public agenda’3 is
seen as a possible means to fill the governance gap left by declining power,
capacity, or willingness of states to engage with global governance issues. The
positive assessment of corporations in terms of PCSR provides support for enhanc-
ing the role played by corporations in developmental activities and in (public)
governance, notably in third-world countries4 and envisages a role for transnational
1Ireland and Pillay (2010).
2Ireland and Pillay (2010), Jones and Haigh (2007), Van Oosterhout (2005), Veldman (2011).
3Crane and Matten (2008), p. 29.
4Garriga and Mele (2004), Matten and Crane (2005), Ne´ron and Norman (2008), Moon et al.
(2005), Post (2002), Schwartz and Carroll (2008), Scherer et al. (2006), Schwab (2008), Logsdon
and Wood (2005), Wood and Logsdon (2008). 1
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corporations (TNCs) in political processes.5 Portraying TNCs as actors with a
legitimate role in public governance functions and processes provides support for
the idea that corporations and TNCs can be regulated by voluntary or quasi-
voluntary means, such as self-regulation, voluntary disclosure, stakeholder com-
munication, and compliance.6
However, many commentators have expressed scepticism about the uptake and
effectiveness of PCSR. Even where a positive business case can be relatively easily
established, such as workplace safety, emissions reductions, or diversity, these
issues are not readily adopted, even in companies that have adopted a CSR agenda.7
Where such issues are not addressed in a meaningful or adequate way, the bigger
issues like human rights, fraud and corruption, tax evasion and inequality are even
less likely to be addressed. Also, because the assumptions behind these positive
assessments relate to rather underspecified conceptions of the public corporation
and of corporate governance, the PCSR debate tends to overlook the following: the
role of corporate theory in establishing the position of corporations and TNCs in
relation to other ‘entities’, such as citizens, NGOs and states, particularly in the
transnational domain8; the role of corporate governance theory in setting the
structural conditions for strategic decisions; and the specific political economy
that the currently dominant theory of corporate governance supports.9 In light of
such critiques, the positive assessment of public governance and political activity
and the endorsement of an enabling regulatory model for TNCs, based on soft law
and self-regulation in the PCSR debate is questionable. To engage with these issues
I take a closer look in this chapter at a range of assumptions about the status of the
modern public corporation and corporate groups.
The understanding of what a public company is, how its corporate governance
processes are structured and function, and how it functions in modern political
economy are largely determined by the separate legal entity (SLE) Veldman and
Willmott (2017). Firstly, I consider the separate legal entity (SLE) as an historically
evolving and to this day largely unsettled10 type of legal construct, which provides
the conceptual basis for the status, structure and governance of the modern public
corporation.
Secondly, I explore some of the ways in which the evolving and unsettled status
of the SLE plays out in relation to attributions of responsibility to the modern
corporation. I will explore how direct attributions of responsibility, accountability,
and liability to the corporation on the basis of its identifications as an integrated
‘subject’ or a ‘citizen’ are problematic, because corporate theory allows for the
simultaneous use of multiple types of identification for the status of this construct in
5Carroll et al. (2012), p. 405.
6Abbott and Snidal (2000), Ireland and Pillay (2010), Scherer and Palazzo (2007, 2011), Vogel
(2007), Zadek (2001).
7See also Deakin and Hobbs (2007).
8Banerjee (2008), Jones and Haigh (2007), Van Oosterhout (2010), Rajak (2011).
9Ireland (2016).
10Veldman (2016). 2
relation to the corporation. The unsettled theoretical status of the corporate group
adds another layer of complexity to such attributions. On the basis of this explora-
tion of the SLE, I argue that an alternative engagement with ‘corporate’ responsi-
bility is possible by examining how notions of corporate architecture constrain and
direct the position and fiduciary duties of executive managers and board members.
In the discussion and conclusions, I argue that the scope for the assumption of
corporate (ir)responsibility is related to the stabilisation of assumptions about the
SLE, and specifically to the role of the SLE in providing the basis for a specific
corporate architecture. This leads me to conclude that the debate about corporate
(ir)responsibility in PCSR can be brought forward by considering the debate on the
historical development of the status of the SLE and the modern corporation; the
debate on corporate architectures and the way they enable and constrain the
conditions for strategic decision-making; and the debate on the connection between
stabilisations of the SLE and political economy.
2 Development of the Modern Corporation
The modern conception of the public corporation only developed its main charac-
teristics from the nineteenth century onwards. At the heart of the characteristics that
define the modern public corporation stands the separate legal entity (SLE) as a
highly specific legal construct. During its initial development, the SLE was broadly
conceived as a legal ‘entity’ that provided specific functions, but was substantially
no more than a placeholder.11 In the placeholder conception the SLE could be
identified as a representation of ‘the corporation’, but only to a very limited extent.
In relation to this placeholder conception the identification of the SLE as a legal
‘subject’, ‘person’, or ‘citizen’ can be understood as no more than a simple
ontological category mistake,12 while attributions of agency and responsibility
typically take place in relation to concrete individuals that make up the corporation,
offering some degree of theoretical consistency with notions like methodological
individualism.13
However, because the theoretical status of the SLE and its relation to the broader
notion of the modern corporation were never adequately settled the SLE could
gradually become conflated with the broader notion of ‘the corporation’ allowing
for the identification of the SLE in relation to multiple referents,14 such as a legal
entity, subject or person, as well as an aggregation of individuals, a group repre-
sentation, or a representation of constituencies. The resulting extended conception
of the corporation provided the basis for the attribution of various qualities and
11Cohen (1919), Freund (1897), Radin (1932).
12Lampert (2016).
13Gindis (2009), Hodgson (2007), Veldman (2016a).
14Veldman (2016a). 3
functions, including (contractual) agency, (citizenship) rights, and protections in
relation to this multiplicity of referents.15
By the end of the nineteenth century the extended conception provided the
modern corporation with a theoretical status that is best described as that of a
schizophrenic Cheshire Cat.16 Although the incoherent theoretical status and the
broad economic and political implications of the SLE in the extended conception
provided the basis for ongoing social, political and economic contestation17 the
functions provided by the SLE in the extended conception provided important
outcomes in terms of political economy and were therefore retained for ‘pragmatic’
reasons.18
3 Corporate Responsibility
The theoretical conception of the corporation is particularly relevant to examine the
possibility for the attribution of responsibility and liability. If the placeholder
conception is accepted, the SLE as an entity can be largely ignored and responsi-
bility and liability can be attributed easily to natural persons. The extended con-
ception of the corporation, by contrast, functions on the basis of the reification and
singularisation of the SLE as a legal ‘entity’, ‘subject’ or ‘person’, providing the
basis for the idea that attributions of rights, agency, responsibility, and liability can
be directed at this construct. In addition, the extended conception retains other
referents for the broader concept of the corporation, including the aggregation of
individuals.
Overall, then, corporate theory ostensibly operates on the basis of an extended
conception that creates a highly theoretical notion of the corporation as an inte-
grated ‘subject’, ‘person’, or ‘citizen’,19 while in the background the placeholder
conception continues to relate to the corporation as an aggregation of individuals
and to the SLE as a mere ‘artificial’ construct that is only functionally attributed
with ownership and liabilities.20 Between these positions, agency, rights, liability
and responsibility continue to be functionally attributed to the SLE and to the
corporation, but any direct attribution of responsibility21 or liability toward the
15Ireland (1999), Veldman (2016a), Veldman and Willmott (2017).
16Allen (1992), Naffine (2003), Veldman (2016a).
17Bowman (1996), Hannah (2010 [1967]), Harris (2006), Johnson (2010).
18Dewey (1926, 1931), Foster (2006), Hallis (1978), Lawson (1957).
19Dodd (1931), Dume´nil and Le´vy (2001), Ireland and Pillay (2010), p. 6; Kaysen (1957).
20Blair (2015), Dewey (1926), Freund (1897), Ireland (1999), Lederman (2000), Ireland (2003),
Naffine (2003), Veldman (2016a).
21Bakan (2005), Chandler and Mazlish (2006), Dan-Cohen (1986), Donaldson (1982), French
(1984), Mason (1959), Moore (1962), Morris (1919), Nader and Green (1977).4
SLE or toward ‘the corporation’ as a single and integrated construct is likely to fail
in practice.22
The problematic conceptualisations of the corporation and the SLE are interest-
ing for the development of the debate on ‘corporate responsibility’ for various
reasons. First, the unclear status of these constructs introduces questions about the
mapping of agency, responsibility and liability onto these legal constructs.23
Because the invocation of the term ‘corporate’ provides many opportunities for
this mapping in relation tomoral or ethical attributions of ‘responsibility’, but also in
relation to effective attributions of liability,24 the question how the corporation and
the SLE can be stabilised, both separately and in relation to one another, as legal
constructs, becomes the first question to pose in a debate on corporate responsibility.
Second, in the PCSR debate, the analogy of corporations or TNCs to the position
of integrated ‘actors’ and their positioning as ‘subjects’ or ‘citizens’ with a norma-
tive agenda provides a background to project responsibility and ‘citizenly’ qualities
to these constructs.25 As these qualities are projected onto legal constructs with a
problematic conceptual status that is hard to hold liable, the use of analogous
reasoning to argue for the expansion of the role of these legal constructs in (public)
governance tasks in the transnational domain and for inclusion into political
activity, notably in third-world countries26 needs to be rethought.
A more specific reason to rethink this type of analogous reasoning is that the
identification of the corporation as a ‘subject’ or ‘citizen’ with ‘a bundle of
symmetrical responsibilities and rights’ is problematic in relation to the identifica-
tion of the relative status and rights of other kinds of legal constructs operating in
the category of the legal subject, like citizens, NGOs, and states.27
This is particularly true in the context of the transnational corporation (TNC).
TNCs are conceived as groups of separate legal entities, and because subsidiaries
are typically set up according to the law of the jurisdiction in which that ‘entity’ has
been set up and attributed separately with agency, ownership, and rights, TNCs
typically cannot be addressed as an integrated theoretical entity under international
law.28 The TNC, then, presents a construct without formal legal status, but with an
implicitly integrated status and attendant protections and privileges in and between
multiple jurisdictions. Moreover, despite their problematic status, TNCs have
increasingly gained recognition in international legal fora and standard setting
22Monks and Minow (2009), p. 25; Veldman (2010).
23See also Lampert (2016).
24Veldman (2010).
25Lampert (2016), Veldman (2010).
26Carroll et al. (2012), p. 405; Garriga and Mele´ (2004), Matten and Crane (2005), Ne´ron and
Norman (2008), Moon et al. (2005), Post (2002), Schwartz and Carroll (2008), Logsdon andWood
(2005), Wood and Logsdon (2008), Scherer et al. (2006), Schwab (2008).
27Van Oosterhout (2005), MacLeod (2008).
28Macleod and Lewis (2004), MacLeod (2008), Robe´ (2011).5
committees as integrated constructs, leading to a further growth of agency, rights,
and powers, including sovereign powers.29 In contrast, unlike the corporation and
the TNC, citizens, NGOs, and states typically have limited means to evade the
jurisdictional system in which they are constituted and provide a construct with a
clearer type of referent for the attribution of agency, liability and responsibility.30
Specifically in the transnational domain, therefore, the latter type of ‘actors’ is left
to rely on ‘quasi- or non-legal instruments which either lack binding force alto-
gether or whose binding force is noticeably weaker than that usually associated with
‘hard’ law’.31
The identification of corporations and TNCs as ‘actors’, ‘subjects’, ‘persons’, or
‘citizens’ and the strengthening of such an identification through the adoption of
broad notions like ‘responsibility’ and ‘citizenship’ are instrumental in naturalising
the status of these constructs. As such, these identifications obfuscate the problem-
atic theoretical status of the corporation and the TNC as well as the problematic
capacity for the identification of agency, responsibility, and liability to these
constructs. More broadly, such identifications help naturalise the projection of an
interaction between corporations and other types of legal entities as nominally
equal agents. A misrepresentation of the status of different kinds of legal constructs,
in turn, helps obscure the differences between the actual capacity for agency and
redress between different types of legal constructs, particularly in the transnational
domain.32 Ultimately, this helps the continuation of an unequal distribution of
rights and an unequal capacity for redress in the form of effective engagement
between different types of actors or entities.33
For these reasons, the use of notions like ‘responsibility’ and ‘citizenship’ as a
normative background to justify the assumption of governance tasks and active
engagement in the political domain seems problematic, and particularly so in
relation to TNCs that operate as corporate groups in a transnational domain
where nation states are limited in their ability to provide de facto control and
regulation.34 Similarly, the assumptions underlying soft law may be questioned.
Abbott and Snidal argue that: ‘. . . soft law facilitates compromise, and thus
mutually beneficial cooperation, between actors with different interests and values,
different time horizons and discount rates, and different degrees of power’.35 It
seems fair to argue that the acknowledgement of differences in the status of
29Ireland and Pillay (2010), Morgan (2008), Robe´ (1997).
30Veldman (2016b).
31Ireland and Pillay (2010), p. 15.
32Blair (2015), Jones and Haigh (2007), Veldman and Parker (2012), Veldman (2013),
Veldman (2013).
33Jones and Haigh (2007), Ireland and Pillay (2010), Laufer (1996), Morgan (2009), Van
Oosterhout (2005, 2010), Rajak (2011), Villiers (2008).
34Anker-Sørensen (2016), Ma¨h€onen (2016), Robe´ (1997), Veldman (2013), Wood and Logsdon
(2008), Veldman (2013).
35Abbott and Snidal (2000, p. 422). 6
different types of legal constructs, and the provision of a regulatory model that
enables these types of constructs to interact under conditions and rules that allow a
fair engagement and similar means for redress36 would be essential preconditions
before soft law arrangements and self-regulation can be considered.37
4 Corporate Architecture, Responsibility and the Political
Economy of Stabilisations of the SLE
A different way to explore ‘corporate responsibility’ is to look at the ‘architecture’
of public corporations, and more specifically at the role of specific stabilisations of
the corporation and the SLE in providing different conceptions of this architecture.
To do so, I take a quick look at different stabilisations of the theoretical status and
practical outcomes of the modern corporation during the nineteenth and twentieth
Century.
From the mid-nineteenth century, the attribution of the ownership and liabilities
of the corporation to the SLE as an increasingly reified construct provided a new
type of organisational ‘architecture’, in which the position of all corporate constit-
uencies was fundamentally changed.38 Notably, shareholders were able to invest
safely and without the duties and liabilities of oversight or management.39 In this
new set-up, shareholders became a largely external constituency without direct
management or control functions. As ownership and liabilities rested with the
entity, it was the SLE, the corporate ‘entity’, itself, that became the principal,40
while the corporate board was positioned at the heart of corporate strategising.41
The development of the SLE in the placeholder conception thus provided the basis
for an architecture of the modern corporation in which the positions, relations,
rights and responsibilities of all constituent groups and their relations were funda-
mentally changed in comparison with the previously dominant model of the
unlimited liability partnership.42
From the 1930s onwards, the problematic theoretical justification of the
extended conception of the SLE, the role of the modern corporation in providing
a cornerstone for oligopolistic capitalist organisation,43 and the de facto
36Anker-Sørensen (2016), Gramlich and Wheeler (2003), Palan et al. (2010).
37Abbott and Snidal (2000), Banerjee (2008), Rajak (2011), Scheuch (this volume), Scherer and
Palazzo (2007, 2011), Tracey et al. (2005), Vogel (2007), Zadek (2001).
38Johnson (2010), Khurana (2007), Perrow (2002).
39Veldman and Willmott (2017).
40Lan and Heracleous (2010).
41Veldman and Willmott (2017), Millon (2014).
42Gevurtz (2004), Ireland (1999), Johnson (2010).
43Davis (2009), Hannah (2010 [1976]), Johnson (2010), Marens (2012), Murphy and
Ackroyd (2013). 7
diminishing of capacity for shareholder control and a concomitant shift to practical
independence from direct shareholder control for corporate managers,44 provided
the basis for a new view of corporate architecture, in which the board’s fiduciary
duties towards the ‘entity’ as the principal45 were identified as duties toward ‘the
corporation’ as a whole. As a result of this stabilisation the rights, protections, and
proceeds provided by the SLE could be distributed to all corporate constituencies46;
the long-term viability of the corporation and all constituencies’ interests became
central to the boards’ role; and the interests of shareholders could be interpreted as a
by-product of the success of the corporation as a whole.47 Taking this stabilisation
as the basis for corporate governance one could argue that: ‘...corporate social
responsibility is not a goal to be pursued in itself but, rather, an integral part of the
day-to-day operations of a company that focuses on long-term value creation.’48
Since the 1970s, the nexus of contracts (NoC) theory has sharply contested this
understanding of the modern corporation. Conceiving of the corporation as a nexus
of contracts, NoC theory reduces the status of the SLE to a negligible ‘legal fiction’,
sidelining the need for justification and its effects for corporate architecture, and
conceives of the position and role of the board in the public corporation as the
outcome of a direct and ongoing contractual relation between shareholders and
board members.49 The resulting governance model embeds directors’ duties in a
dyadic model that revolves exclusively around executive managers and (particular
types of) shareholders.
The redefinition of the architecture of the public corporation in NoC theory has
had definite effects on political economy.50 Since the 1970s, there has been a
massive increase in the proportion of corporate profits going to dividends and
share buybacks, while the need to keep executive ‘judgment’ reoriented exclusively
to the creation of shareholder value has led to a continuous rise in remuneration for
managerial executives. As these increases on the side of executives and particular
kinds of shareholders51 are typically funded by the uptake of short-term strategies
that come at the expense of the privileges and protections of all other stake-
holders,52 including various types of shareholders with a longer time horizon,53
44Berle and Means (2007 [1932]).
45Lan and Heracleous (2010).
46Khurana (2007), Lan and Heracleous (2010), Millon (2013), Veldman and Willmott (2016).
47Blair and Stout (2011), Millon (2014).
48Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee (2016), p. 9.
49Aglietta and Rebe´rioux (2005), Lan and Heracleous (2010).
50Dore (2008), Froud et al. (2002), Jacoby (2008, 2011), Ireland (2000, 2005, 2016), Jansson et al.
(2016), Lazonick (2014), Murphy and Willmott (2015), Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011),
Stockhammer (2004), Stout (2012).
51Millon (2013).
52Johnson (2012).
53Strine (2010). 8
the stabilisation of the SLE in NoC theory shifts risks away from the core corporate
governance constituencies and towards these other constituencies.
The redefinition of the modern corporation in NoC theory shows how ignoring
the problem of the SLE’s status and the corporation can offer a view on corporate
architecture that makes the interests of two constituencies absolute, while structur-
ally relegating the interests and timeframes of all other corporate constituencies and
stakeholders to the status of ‘externalities’.54 Because the precise theoretical under-
standing of the SLE and the corporation remain contested, while the stabilisation of
their status and their relation to corporate architecture remains contingent, the
development of and choice between these understandings is vitally important to
understand the scope of ‘corporate responsibility’.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
To explore notions of corporate responsibility, I have taken a closer look at the
conceptual development of the modern corporation. I have sought to illustrate how
the contingent and conceptually confounded status of the SLE, the corporation, and
the corporate group allows for the use of multiple referents and how this conceptual
status makes the attribution of agency, responsibility, and liability to these con-
structs problematic. Such attributions of agency, and particularly on the basis of the
identification of the status of these constructs as a ‘subject’, ‘person’, or ‘citizen’
has been shown to obscure and naturalise de facto differences in status, power, and
means for redress between different types of legal constructs, such as corporations,
TNCs, citizens, NGOs, and states, and notably so in the supranational domain.55
Considering the problematic status of the public corporation and corporate
groups, and the role of this status in relation to attributions of agency, responsibility
and liability and interactions with other legal constructs, it seems fair to suggest that
the focus on notions like ‘partnerships’, ‘soft law’ and ‘self-regulation’ as
emphasised in the PCSR debate, is a distraction from the provision of effective
‘hard law’ regulations, standards and protections that could enable a level playing
field between legal constructs with a structurally unequal theoretical makeup.
Similarly, in the presence of these conceptual disparities, the use of concepts like
‘responsibility’ and ‘corporate citizenship’ seems mostly to allow corporations and
TNCs to carry on ‘. . . business as usual—including prioritizing maximization of
shareholder value—while claiming to be caring and socially responsible”.56
54Davis (2009), Horn (2012), Khurana (2007), Johnson (2012, p. 1163); Pye (2001, 2002),
Veldman and Willmott (2016).
55Banerjee (2008), Jones and Haigh (2007, p. 52); Murphy (2011), Rajak (2011), Tracey et al.
(2005), Veldman (2013).
56Ireland and Pillay (2010), p. 14. 9
To move beyond such assumptions about corporate responsibility, I explored
how evolving corporate ‘architectures’ provide differing backgrounds for the
assumption of ‘responsibility’ and briefly touched on how these architectures relate
to political economy. Between the 1930s and 1970s the problematic justification for
the status of the corporation and the SLE provided the basis for an architecture in
which boards were oriented to a long-term view and the provision of outcomes for a
broad set of constituencies.57 As the significance of the SLE and its effects58 was
summarily dismissed in the view of corporate governance that became dominant
from the 1970s onwards, this architecture was changed to a new one, in which the
core governance relation was limited to a dyadic relation between shareholders and
executive.59 This new architecture allowed broader responsibilities than (short-
term) increases in shareholder value to be relegated to a position external to the
core corporate governance relation and, hence, not within the ambit of directors’
duties.60
Shifting discourses about the status and legitimacy of the corporation and the
SLE thus provide the basis for the stabilisation of different corporate architectures,
which in turn define and delineate the direction of directors’ duties,61 accountabil-
ity,62 transparency, compliance, disclosure63 and materiality in reporting.64
Because the stabilisation of the status of the SLE and a related corporate architec-
ture effectively provide the basis for the division of privileges and protections
inside the corporation; because the conceptual development of these stabilisations
is clearly marked by effects in terms of political economy65; and because these
stabilisations embed a notion of corporate architecture that strengthens or dimin-
ishes the theoretical position and discretionary space for boards to relate to broader
interests66 including the assumption of ‘corporate responsibility’, the historical
development and contingent stabilisation of notions of the SLE and the corporation,
and of attendant corporate architectures, provide interesting points of departure for
the debate on ‘corporate responsibility’.
This focus for ‘corporate responsibility’ allows for a broader research agenda as
it shifts the debate on corporate responsibility away from morals and ethics,67 and
57Drucker (2006[1946]), Fayol (2013[1949]), Khurana (2007), Moore and Rebe´rioux (2007), Lan
and Heracleous (2010), Segrestin and Hatchuel (2011).
58Bratton (1989).
59Aglietta and Rebe´rioux (2005).
60Sja˚fjell et al. (2015), Veldman and Willmott (2016).
61Millon (2013).
62Keay and Loughrey (2015).
63Veldman and Willmott (2016).
64Eccles and Youmans (2016).
65Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), p. 3; Ireland and Pillay (2010), Jones and Haigh (2007), Veldman
and Willmott (2016), Zingales (2000).
66Friedman (1970), Jansson et al. (2016), Veldman and Willmott (2013), Veldman et al. (2016).
67Levitt (1958). 10
toward the formation of institutions of corporate governance like company law,
corporate governance codes, accounting rules, listing rules and other financial
regulations that continue to embed particular notions of the modern corporation
and its architecture.68 It also enables a focus on the shifting conceptions of the
modern corporation, corporate architectures, and political economy internationally.
Bowman notes that: ‘the corporate reconstruction of the world political economy in
the late twentieth century ... appears to be modeled on the corporate transformation
of North American society in the early-to-mid-twentieth century.’69 This introduces
the question why the notion of the modern corporation and of corporate gover-
nance, which are problematic to justify and stabilise in theoretical terms, and which
provide increasingly problematic political and economic effects,70 nevertheless
spread rapidly and relatively uniformly across legal and economic systems with
very different historical antecedents and conceptual starting positions on
organisational representation, organisational architecture, and political economy
in largely the same short time frames.71 It also raises the question why there seems
to be such limited explicit theoretical and practical discussion on and competition
between conceptions of the corporation and the TNC, of corporate architecture, and
of different possibilities for regulation and codification in accounting theory, in
executive and investor practice, in the curricula of law and management schools,
and in systems with very different legal and economic orientations, and in public
policy and regulatory decision-making in political systems.72
A focus on historically contingent stabilisations of central concepts underlying
the modern corporation can help frame questions of ‘responsibility’ in terms of
corporate architecture and corporate governance. Doing so, this focus allows the
debate on corporate responsibility to engage more directly with the political
economy outcomes of theory production in the field of corporate governance,
notably the declining capacity for public corporations to produce long-term sus-
tainable value for broader constituencies than just shareholders and executives,73 an
increasingly polarising global division of social wealth74 that is linked to the
creation of political instability in the UK, the US, and Europe,75 and ecological
sustainability.
68Jansson et al. (2016).
69Bowman (1996), p. 291.
70Kay (2015), Reich (2016).
71Guinnane et al. (2007), Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), Gordon and Roe (2004), Jansson et al.
(2016), Larsson-Olaison (2014).
72Aglietta and Rebe´rioux (2005), Clarke (2016), Davis (2009), Horn (2012), Khurana (2007),
Morgan (2009), Pye (2001, 2002), Veldman and Willmott (2016).
73Keay and Zhao (2015), Tricker (2015), Zumbansen (2012).
74Ireland (2005), Lazonick (2013, 2014), Piketty (2014).
75Reich (2016). 11
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